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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking & Finance at the International 
Hellenic University. It examines whereas a combination of acquiring and target company, 
regarding their classification of operations, can outperform significantly the rest of them, in a 
merger deal of the US energy industry. It consists of two stages. In the first stage, the acquiring 
companies are unilaterally classified and their abnormal returns around the deal’s 
announcement date are measured. In the second stage, certain variables are tested for their 
significance, along with the usage of a nonparametric test. Diversification of operations, in 
general, is found significant while further analysis did not show any significant results. 
Deregulation, although is responsible for initiating merger waves, in this case was not found 
contributing. Finally, there have been found significant results for acquiring and target firms 
that both operate in a same SIC-classified group for a cumulative period of five days after the 
announcement and a cumulative period of five days prior and after the announcement. 
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dissertation. Also, I would like to thank professors Fragiskos Archontakis and Christos Grose 
for their suggestions. Last but not least, I would like to thank PhD candidate Kleopatra 
Koulikidou for her advices and suggestions. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) constitute a great component of the financial activity. 
According to the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances just for 2015, there have 
been over 46000 M&A’s worldwide, accumulating to a total value of over $4.6 trillion. 
Furthermore, a merger or an acquisition can be considered the most important single 
transaction for a company, as it can change all of its operations significantly, and the ones 
occurring in the energy sector can have a significant impact. Therefore, it is not strange that a 
large part of financial literature is devoted to this topic.  
Over the last fifty years many economic theories have been developed, as an attempt to 
explain the rationale for engaging into an M&A deal. Acquiring companies, for instance, may 
go into a deal for reasons of efficiency improvement, market power establishment or empire 
building. While empirical evidence has proven many of these theories valid, some of them 
seem to explain the deals for only specific time periods. For example, in the 1960’s many deals 
were driven by diversification reasons, whereas in the 1990’s these occurred as a response to 
deregulation actions. A great portion of academic research focuses on the question of whether 
mergers and acquisitions create value. Findings, however, are not conclusive. To answer this, 
a researcher has to consider many factors including value measurement, the type and method 
of the deal, and the individual characteristics of the parties involved.  
Furthermore, the energy industry in the US market is undergoing a major deregulation change. 
Generally, in each state, the generation and distribution of the electric energy was federally 
regulated and there was one generator company, which was also responsible for the energy 
distribution. As a result of deregulation acts, the authorities of each state can now more 
decide, individually, on separating these two operations, or not. While the generator company 
still holds the rights for energy producing, its distribution is now an open market, where 
individuals can participate as proxies, and consumers can select which of them is more 
suitable to their needs. Still, only seventeen states have fully deregulated the distribution 
process. In M&A’s, geographical deregulation can indicate a significant factor for the firms in 
this particular area.   
  
8 
 
In this dissertation after examining, bibliographically, the main reasons for conducting a 
merger deal, it will be studied if there can be an M&A motive, relevant to the sub-industries 
in which the corresponding firms can be classified into. Specifically, this study will show if there 
is a combination of the sub-sectors of the US energy sector, where both acquirer and target 
firm operate, which can be significantly more lucrative than the rest. Additionally, as this 
sector is undergoing some serious changes like deregulation shocks, this study could assist on 
everyone interested, to detect whether a positive return can occur due to this effect. 
Furthermore, the gap in the academic literature will be filled, regarding the undergoing 
changes of this particular economic sector. 
Chapter 2 describes the relevant literature on this topic. It includes the basic motives that 
usually drive M&A’s, and critical review of the results that were found and can be applied for 
the topic of this particular study. Chapter 3 includes the methodology that is used in order for 
the results to be extracted, the issues that occurred and the corresponding solutions that were 
implemented. Chapter 4 includes the analysis and the interpretation of the data, while in 
chapter 5 there is a conclusion of the study and the final comments. 
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2 Literature review 
 
The literature about M&A’s and the value creation that is relevant to them is extensive. Many 
factors have been analyzed, that affect both acquirer’s and target’s company value in the post-
deal period. While many authors agree that a successful merger leads to an increase in value 
in total, usually it is the target that is benefited most from the deal, as there are found 
significantly positive returns for them, caused by the premiums paid. Instead, for the acquirers 
mixed results have been found, as most of the times they face a deterioration in their share 
value and, when an increase is noticed, this is usually relatively small. The results for the 
acquirers include significantly negative, or insignificantly positive results around the 
announcement of the deal (Faulkner, D., et al., 2014). 
Various theories have been proposed in order to explain the nature of M&A’s and why firms 
engage to them. The most profound include the efficiency theory (where mergers are 
designed to achieve financial, managerial and operational synergies), monopoly theory 
(where mergers are planned for market power reasons), valuation theory (which attributes 
the deal to better information of executives than the market), empire-building theory (where 
managers are interested in their personal gains and do not maximize the shareholders’ value), 
process theory (where M&A’s are part of a strategic plan for the firm), raider theory (where 
wealth is just transferred from the acquired company to the shareholders of the acquiring 
company), and disturbance theory (which is associated with high levels of uncertainty and the 
creation of merger waves). While in some of them have been found more consistent evidence 
than the others, all of them more or less have explained the causes of M&A deals (Trautwein, 
F., 1990). 
The management of an acquiring firm can thus justify M&A’s due to reasons of increasing 
efficiency, as this can result due to synergies and economies of scale and scope. Revenues can 
also increase through size augmentation and geographical diversification, as these factors can 
depict the fact that the acquiring company has reached a level in its home market where it 
can operate functionally or have sufficient profits. Among other factors that result to synergies 
are the entrance in new markets, the potential increase of future cash flows, the acquisition 
of scarce resources and the protection of current market share (Holland, D., et al., 2000).  
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Management synergies can also be a possible motive, as they are related with the operational 
efficiency, where the management of the acquiring company considers itself superior and 
more capable than the one of the target company and can use the client relationships and 
processes of the latter more efficiently (Yaghoubi, R. et al., 2016). Gains can also be derived 
by the capability of the acquirer to use some strategic benefits such as favorable regulations, 
tax arbitrage advantages, and superior technology. Consequently, a merger deal can have a 
positive impact in shares’ value. However, managerial motives can have some severe 
consequences as well, as they are associated with hubris hypotheses. Overconfident 
managers convince themselves that their evaluation for the target company is correct, when 
in fact they are wrong, and cause value destruction (Roll, R., 1986). 
Horizontal acquisitions relevant to industry characteristics, are also found to have an impact 
on value creation and gain division (Huyghebaert, N., Luypaert, M., 2013). The authors in this 
paper, study the effect of characteristics such as industry sales concentration, industry foreign 
competition, minimum efficient scale, sales growth, industry deregulation and technological 
intensity in European acquisitions. They find for bidders, for a period 35 days prior to the 
announcement and up to 5 days after it, a statistically significant gain of 2.60%. Also, the 
cumulative abnormal returns for bidders are usually increased the days prior to the 
announcement and they end up negative around 45 days after the announcement. Industry 
sales concentration has a statistically significant negative impact on the wealth effect, 
meaning that market participants disapprove the reduction in competition due to acquisitions. 
The ratio of firm size to the minimum efficient scale is also found significantly negative, 
regarding to value creation, as a substantially large company may lead to diseconomies of 
scale. Industry sales growth and value creation seem to have a U-shaped form, meaning that 
bidders are benefited in industries with extremely high or low sales growth. Foreign 
competition and technological intensity are not found to have a significant contribution to 
M&A wealth effect. Deregulation impact is also not found to contribute, showing the 
difference of the efficient and centrally regulated US market, with the European one. As for 
the gain division, between target and bidder, the study shows that is not the industry 
conditions that are contributing, rather than deal and firm characteristics. Despite the 
findings, though, this study does not answer on how the deals affect certain financial firm 
indices (i.e. EPS) of the acquiring company, or their levels in the period prior to the deal. Also, 
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it does not apply necessarily to all kinds of same-industry deals, as horizontal acquisitions are 
just a portion of them. Finally, it is only Europe-oriented and does not consider the impact of 
economic shocks.  
One of the factors that also has been studied in M&A’s is clustering. Mergers seem to appear 
in historical waves, usually preceding a significant economic or technological shock, or 
deregulation actions (Mitchell, M.L, Mulherin, J.H., 1996). These periods are associated with 
overvaluation relevant to the acquiring firms, the management of which usually acknowledges 
and attempts to redeem with a merger. Alongside with the study of hubris effect, on behalf 
of the acquiring firm’s management, which has been observed in many cases, it can be 
therefore understood why market participants do not usually reward acquirers with a positive 
share return, in the after-announcement period. After deregulatory shocks, returns are 
usually higher for the bidders, indicating value creation for the industry, while pre-bid 
performance can also be positive compared with non-wave acquirers that have negative 
returns. It is also found that in the case of distortional deals, acquirers tend to find themselves 
as targets after a period. However, this proportion is smaller for bidders included in a merger 
wave. First-movers seem to have an advantage as they acquire the best targets, while late 
acquirers tend to surpass an optimal point, inside the wave, leading the latter to a distortional 
ending. While this is also relevant to herding issues, merger waves initiated by shocks, can 
drive large-scale asset reallocations.  
The components that affect the efficiency of a deal, and how these contribute to the return 
for acquiring firm’s shareholders, during an industrial merger wave, have also been studied 
(Harford, J., 2003). The author finds evidence that, during these waves, the announcement 
date returns of the acquirers are bigger, compared with the non-wave mergers. Generally, an 
acquirer in the announcement date finds itself to have negative announcement return; a 
characteristic which is consistent with hubris hypothesis. But in a wave this relation is 
overthrown and acquirers, on average, enjoy higher returns compared with non-wave 
acquirers and are less probable to appear hubris issues. This is explained by the fact that in a 
merger both acquirer and target companies are being well-managed, as they both usually 
enjoy high market-to-book ratios. The author finds also evidence that the liquidity, combined 
with industrial shocks, is an important factor (Harford, J., 2005). This is not peculiar, 
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considering that a large number of merger wave deals occurs in booming markets, where 
capital is easily accessible and the constraints are insignificant. Hence, companies with large 
cash reserves are more probable to acquire other firms. In conclusion, capital liquidity 
combined with industrial shocks can lead to M&A wave emergence which contributes, 
respectively, to industrial wave clustering. 
However, these results of Hartford are consistent with the neoclassical hypotheses which 
attempts to explain merger waves. There is also the market misevaluation framework. 
According to this, M&A waves take place in periods where many firms are overvalued, in 
market terms, and there is high price dispersion (Rhodes-Kropf, M., Viswanathan, S., 2004). 
For this reason, the markets are considered inefficient and executives attempt to use this 
feature for the benefit of their firm. Instead of using cash, the executives will engage in 
acquisitions and obtain the target company by using the overvalued stocks at a favorable 
price. This notion alongside with the misperception of synergies can result to M&A wave 
activity. This activity is enhanced even further, as the target companies are usually 
undervalued, and their managers wish to cash out the benefits from the deal. As a result, 
acquiring firms are benefited from the deal, as they buy quality assets in low market prices, 
and it is concluded that firms with high market-to-book ratio in a merger wave, will acquire 
firms with low market-to-book ratio, a conclusion consistent with the Q-theory of mergers.   
The distribution of merger gains between target and acquirer is also a parameter that affects 
merger deals. More specifically, it has been studied how the industry dependency and 
bargaining power of the participants of the deal, affect dollar gain returns (Ahern, K.R., 2012). 
Study has shown that, in vertical mergers, strength and asymmetry of product market 
relations affect the distribution of merger gains. The more dependent is one industry on the 
other, the less are the gains attributed to regarding company in the deal, either as a supplier 
or a customer. Also, after taking into consideration market-to-book ratios and firm and 
industry profitability, study shows that the firm which holds the scarcer products or operations 
in the merger deal, is the one enjoying the greater gains. As a conclusion, the author mentions 
that there is remarkable variation in merger gain distribution and that, on average, and in 
contradiction with the common belief, the gains of the target are just modestly more than the 
ones of the acquirer.  
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Under the appliance of network topology, there are also found evidence on the importance 
of industry links and how these contribute to M&A deals during merger waves (Ahern, K.R., 
Harford, J., 2014). The authors, after connecting the industries through customer-supplier 
trade flows, find that cross-industry mergers can occur under strong market relations. 
Moreover, merger deals can spread towards the industry network with the supplier links to 
have stronger proliferation impact than customer links. Finally, they find that industries that 
belong to a product-oriented subnetwork, can initiate merger waves that expand to the wider 
economy. Still, as authors mention, the merger intensity inside the industries has not been 
studied. Hence, there may be a connection among sub-sectors of an industry that may lead to 
a significant result. Additionally, the trade flows consist only a single component of how 
industries can be connected. Thus, the impact of other economic factors remains unexplored.  
For the acquisitions in the energy industry, it has been studied how cross-border deals have 
affected the wealth of shareholders in European markets (Bednarczyk, T.P., Schiereck, D., 
Walter, H.N., 2010). The authors, after studying cross-border M&A’s of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) targets from Western European bidders, detected that the main reason for 
the positive impact in shareholder’s value is attributed to the industry relatedness of the 
acquired energy assets, while experience of the bidders and the acquired share proportion did 
not have a significant impact. They also found evidence that shareholders of the acquiring 
company have a significant loss for periods exceeding 15 days after the announcement, and 
that the capital markets, overall, evaluate negatively the M&A’s in the energy sector. This is 
attributed to the belief that acquirers should undergo a modernization process for the 
acquired assets and an alignment with EU regulations that CEE countries did not follow. Along 
with the lack of experience in large scale projects and the uncertainty of success, it can thus 
be explained this negative attitude by the investors and the negative impact on acquirer’s 
shares. However, these results can be indicative just for this particular sector and area, as 
technology is not such a sensitive factor as it is in other industries, and for the detecting period 
(1995-2005), market efficiency was debatable. For instance, in the US market, which is 
considered efficient, respective results could be different. Under market efficiency 
assumptions, the well-functioned companies can adjust immediately to technological 
changes, and thus modernization operations by the acquiring companies may have already 
concluded before any deal.  
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After studying the US market, there are found evidence that when an M&A deal occurs, it 
leads to a reduction in the competition, while the relevant acquiring firm enhances its market 
prospect. This is explained by the enhanced capability of defining higher prices, and thus 
increased profits that lead to greater value for shareholders. Still, this is relevant to domestic 
acquisitions, in which increased oligopolistic power is included, while cross-border M&A’s are 
usually driven by efficiency motives. However, a study of sectoral growth effects in the US 
market, shows different results (Doytch, N., Cakan, E., 2011). In this case, it is tested the 
growth effect of domestic and international M&A’s, in both aggregated and sector level. 
Differently to the belief that cross-border M&A’s have positive impact overall, the study finds 
evidence that when the acquiring company is a foreign one, this leads to a decline of the local 
economy. While synergies and economies of scale may occur and boost foreign firm’s 
fundamentals, the US market is not benefited. The evidence is consistent in cross-sectional 
level as well, and show that despite foreign firms can have access to efficient markets, due to 
these deals, it can be growth harmed. Still, these cross-border M&A’s do not constitute more 
than a 47% of the total international deals for the period 1990-2007 (Isil, E., Liao, R.C., 
Weisbach, M.S., 2012). Moreover, 97% of these deals involve a private firm, and the impact 
for public acquiring companies is not fully clarified. Still, for these acquirers, there is higher 
probability of entering the deal, when their country follows high accounting standards, has 
high rates of economic development, its currency is more appreciated than the currency of 
the target, and has higher stock market performance. Also, firms with high value are more 
likely to acquire low value firms from other countries, and thus taking advantage of the lower 
cost of capital. 
Despite the numerous papers regarding the acquirers in the energy industry, there has not 
been detected anyone that examines whereas their classification to individual sub-sectors can 
be a contributing factor for positive performance during the days of a merger announcement. 
Moreover, there can be examined whether their segmentation to special sectors (i.e. product 
or service-oriented) can have a significant influence over this performance. After considering 
the relevant literature, and pinpointing some issues where a critical lack of research has been 
found, an answer will be attempted to be given to these questions. The next chapter 
introduces the reader to the scientific approach that has been used. 
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3 Methodology 
 
The methodology that is used, consists two stages. In the first stage, it will be attempted to 
measure the significant impact of the deal, regarding the acquirers. In the second stage, the 
results will be filtered moreover, in order to detect an optimal combination with the acquired 
companies, and whereas there are more significant factors than the regular ones. In general, 
the acquiring firms of the energy industry will be detected (the criteria are presented in 
chapter 4), and their abnormal returns will be measured individually. Then, they will be 
matched with the target companies, in order to find a particular acquirer-target combination 
with significant results, through this segmentation of the energy industry.  
3.1 First Stage Approach 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the event study methodology has been implemented. 
According to this methodology, the impact that has an event (in this case, the announcement 
of a deal), is evaluated on the behavior of share prices (Kothari, S.P., Warner, J.B., 2007). This 
is done by examining the reactions of the stock prices at the date of the merger 
announcement. The change that may occur, can reflect the changes in the future cash flows.  
First, the announcement date of the merger has to be acknowledged. Then, two periods are 
defined: the event window and the estimation window. The estimation window includes the 
daily share returns prior to the announcement (usually starts 250 trading days before the 
announcement and ends at the announcement date), while the event window includes the 
returns around the announcement date and a period afterwards (meaning it starts on the 
announcement date, and ends at a certain day afterwards). In the next step, the abnormal 
returns (AR) are calculated. This is done by subtracting the expected price return from the 
actual one, in every day in the event window. In general, the return for a specified security i, 
in a time period t, can be described by the following equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
where  𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return, 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] is the expected return which is described by a particular 
model, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the factor that describes the abnormal, or unexpected return. Rearranging, 
the abnormal returns can be calculated as: 
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𝐴𝑅 = 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] 
After that, the abnormal returns are summed and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 
derived for each firm. For a specified period, starting at time 𝑡1 up to time 𝑡2, CAR is measured 
as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
Finally, the CAR’s are aggregated, according to the mid-industry group that each acquirer and 
target firm has been classified into, and the average CAR, named cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR), is extracted. For N acquiring companies that form j group, CAAR is 
measured as: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2)𝑁
𝑁
𝑥=1
 
In this point it is essential for some clarifications to be done. The event study methodology is 
a practical method that is used for measuring the impact of various financial events, such as a 
merger announcement, a dividend distribution or a modification in accounting standards. 
Therefore, its characteristics (i.e. window length) may be applied differently in each case. In 
addition, it should be mentioned that the abnormal returns may not necessarily consider only 
the event window period. There are many cases where the CAR’s are calculated by considering 
returns both prior and after the event. For this study, four different CAR periods were defined: 
five and forty days after the event [CAR(0,5), CAR(0,40)], five days prior and after the event 
[CAR(-5,5)], and forty days prior and after the event [CAR(-40,40)]. 
Regarding the frequency and the form of the data, it was chosen the daily logarithmic return. 
The daily frequency is necessary as the window length is measured in days. However, this can 
remove the normality assumption of distribution due to random fluctuations. This can be 
balanced by the use of logarithmic returns: if the prices are assumed to be log normally 
distributed, then their returns can be considered normally distributed as well. Another reason 
is the raw-log equality: when returns are very small, they are considered, approximately, close 
to the raw returns. Finally, there is the time additivity reason: compounding returns are 
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normally distributed given that the sum of normally distributed variables is normal and that 
these variables are uncorrelated (Henderson J., Glenn, V., 1990). 
The estimation window is defined to start 250 days prior to the announcement date and to 
end either at the announcement date or at certain date before this, depending on the CAR 
period. While there are many choices, long-term windows (that exceed 250 days) have not 
been considered suitable for the event studies for mergers, due to limited significance 
outcomes. Another reason is, as many researchers support, that short-term windows are 
considered more worthy, as they succeed in depicting better any value creation that can be 
conceived in an efficient capital market (Bouwman, C., Fuller, K., Nain, A., 2003). Generally, 
due to the efficient market hypotheses (EMH), prices are expected to adjust quickly to any 
new information, and any change in values reflects the outcome of an acquisition.  
Another crucial issue is the calculation of the expected returns. Usually, the returns are 
calculated by the use of market-adjusted-returns model (Henderson J., Glenn, V., 1990). 
However, various other models have also been suggested for this process and each one holds 
certain merits and drawbacks. For this reason, robustness checking has been considered 
appropriate. Along with the multiple-window usage, and for all the aforementioned CAR’s, 
various risk-adjusted models have been implemented. Specifically, the single-market model, 
the two-factor-market model, the Fama-French-Three-Factor model, and the Fama-French-
four-factor model have been used. Thanks to this multiple implementation, there can be 
performed afterwards, a comparison of the results of these models, by taking into 
consideration various factors. 
Market-adjusted-returns Model (MAR): This model is considered the simplest one to extract 
abnormal returns, as neither an estimation period, nor a regression analysis are required. 
After selecting a benchmark index (for this study the S&P500 is selected), its returns are 
subtracted from the share returns for the detecting period. Simply, by using the formula: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑅𝑚  
is assumed that all stocks have on average the same rate of return. However, it fails to adjust 
for basic systematic risk factors, like the following models do, and thus the systematic risk 
profile of the relevant firms is not depicted properly. 
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Single-Index Market Model, or Market Model (MM): For this model is assumed that there is 
just one factor which causes systematic risk and affects share returns. This factor is 
represented by the returns of an index (S&P500), and for every i stock is calculated as: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚 +  𝑒𝑖 
where 𝐸[𝑅𝑖] is the expected return of the i stock, 𝑎𝑖 is the alpha intercept which describes the 
return that exceeds the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑖 is the covariance factor of the stock with the market, 
𝑅𝑚 is the return of the market index, and 𝑒𝑖 describes the unsystematic risk from firm-specific 
factors. The parameters are estimated from an ordinary least square (OLS) regression over the 
estimation period. This model is used to detect the relation between market and stock 
returns, considering the risk variation as this is associated with these stocks. 
This market model is considered as the standard choice for event studies, due to its easy 
implementation. Still, there are some concerns for its validity, as is assumed that the risk-free 
rate, as represented by the alpha parameter, is constant which is opposite with the 
assumption that market returns vary over time. 
Two-Factor-Market Model (2FMM): The previous model can be expanded, by adding more 
factors which a researcher considers attributing to calculate abnormal returns more 
accurately. Just like the single-index market model, this one calculates the expected return 
from two market indices. For this study there were chosen the S&P500 and the S&P500 Energy 
Indices. Its formula is: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑃500 𝐸𝑁 +  𝑒𝑖 
where 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑃 is the beta factor of the i stock for the S&P500 index, while 𝛽𝑖,𝐸𝑁 is the beta factor 
for the S&P500 Energy Index. The parameters are calculated by OLS regression. In this model, 
the expected returns are subject to systematic risk which can be derived by the beta factors. 
Nevertheless, along with the risk-free contradiction, this model’s efficacy is subject to other 
issues that may occur due to the added factors (i.e. multicollinearity).  
Fama-French-Three-Factor Model (FF3F): This is a model which was designed by E. Fama and 
K. French and expands the rationale of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). It takes into 
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account three factors: company capitalization, Price-to-Book ratio, and market risk. Its 
formula is: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖 
where 𝐸[𝑅𝑖] is the expected return of the i stock, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝑎𝑖 is the alpha 
coefficient, and 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) is the risk premium for the stock, relevant to the market. SMB 
stands for small minus big and measures the historical excess returns of small capitalization 
companies over big ones. HML stands for high minus low and measures the excess returns of 
value stocks (with high P/B ratio) over growth stocks (with small P/B ratio). The coefficients 𝑏𝑠 
and 𝑏𝑣 measure the volatility of their respective values with comparison to the market (Fama, 
E., French, K., 1993). Appropriate portfolios which simulate these components were used. 
Alternatively, to CAPM, this model’s returns are relevant, besides market risk, to the size and 
value of the under-scrutiny firms. This came as a result of the Fama and French research who 
found that small capitalization stocks usually outperform large capitalization stocks, and value 
stocks can outperform growth stocks. This model overcomes the issues relevant with the 
CAPM, as its benchmark estimates are more accurate and can predict, in a diversified 
portfolio, about 95% of the returns. Still, this model is not undisputed, as there is a debate for 
its outperformance tendency and whether this occurs from market efficiency or not.  
Fama-French-Four-Factor model (FF4F), or Carhart model: This model is an extension of the 
previous one. A fourth factor called momentum, is added and describes the tendency of a 
stock price to continue consistently its trend. Its formula is: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑏𝑠.𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖 + 𝑏𝑢.𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖  
UMD stands for up minus down. It can be considered as a zero-cost, self-financing portfolio 
which includes stocks in long position that outperformed the market and stocks in short 
position that underperformed, both prior to a year. The coefficient 𝑏𝑢 describes the volatility 
of this factor, relevant to the market (Carhart, M., 1997).  
Generally, momentum is considered a market anomaly, as it should not indicate further trend 
continuation. According to finance theory, price changes should occur only as a result of 
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changes in supply and demand, or new information. Therefore, momentum is attributed often 
to cognitive biases, as the cause of investors’ underreacting.  
For all the aforementioned models that include alpha and beta coefficients, a regression 
analysis is implemented. Basically, it is performed an OLS time-series regression analysis for 
the estimation window of each CAR period. After that, the CAR’s for each period and for every 
model, are summed and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is calculated for each 
case. 
Once the CAAR’s have been calculated, there should be tested whether they are significantly 
different from zero, for different z-values. Specifically, they will be used the z-values at the 
90th, 95th and 99th percentile. Therefore, the most relevant parametric way is to use the 
standardized cross-sectional test, under the null hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0 
The alternative H1 hypotheses is: 
𝐻1: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 ≠ 0 
For each j group and its relevant CAAR, the t-test is calculated from the following formula: 
𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗 = √𝑁𝑗  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗
 
where 𝑁𝑗 is the total number of companies that constitute 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗 , and 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗 is its 
corresponding standard error. This error component is calculated as: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗 = √
1
𝑁 − 1
 ∑(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑗)2
𝑁
𝑥=1
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3.2 Nonsynchronous data 
 
A time series is described as synchronous if its components are all realized at the same time. 
In other case, the time series and its components are characterized as nonsynchronous (or 
thinly traded), and can create serious implications in time series analysis (Lo, A., 1990). 
Nonsynchronous data usually occur as a result of trading or timing effect. Trading effect is 
relevant to infrequently traded instruments, while timing effect is relevant to different time-
zone trading.  
During the process of data gathering for this study, it was found that a large portion of the 
firms that constituted the data sample, was a subject of nonsynchronous data. Many shares 
were not found to trade every trading day and, additionally, when they did so, they did it at 
very low prices. This affected transaction price data and firm quotes, and thus were marked 
as nonsynchronous. Consequently, this property can have severe repercussions. If a stock is 
not traded actively, as the rest do, its price will fail to reflect the everyday upcoming news. 
This situation will have an impact on the return correlation with the active shares and will 
impel a positive autocorrelation effect with its returns, lagged by the non-trading period. 
Therefore, to deal with this issue, a suitable time series model has to be implemented. While 
there have been proposed various solutions, one of the most acknowledgeable is the method 
of the aggregated coefficients (Dimson, E., 1979). According to this method, observed prices 
can depict the transaction prices of the same period t or the prices in the period t-i (i>0), as 
these were established in that period. As a result, observed prices have an expected value 
which can be calculated as the weighted average of a sequence of prices that would appear if 
there was continuous trading. After applying the aggregated coefficients method in a market 
model exemplification, the analysis concludes in the following regression equation for the 
expected returns: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = ?̂? +  ∑ ?̂?𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=−𝑛
?̂?𝑡+𝑘 + 𝑤𝑡 
where ?̂? and ?̂?𝑘 are the intercept and the slope coefficient respectively, and ?̂?𝑡+𝑘 is the 
relevant market model, or equivalently the market portfolio. In addition, in the study it is 
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made the assumption that at time t-i, a percentage of the market portfolio which equals 
to 𝜑𝑖 has been traded at least once every n periods. The distribution of this proportion is 
considered stationary and identically distributed in time. This means that the following 
properties hold:  
𝜑𝑖 ≥ 𝜑𝑖+𝑗  , 𝑗 > 0 and  ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑛
𝑡=0 = 1 
After that, the market portfolio return can be derived by the following equation:  
?̂?𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑀𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
+  𝑢𝑀𝑡  
where 𝑢𝑀𝑡  is a zero-mean error term which is uncorrelated with 𝜑𝑖 and 𝑀𝑡−𝑖. Regarding 
observed values, it is essential that a consistent beta estimation is applied. In the data sample, 
𝛽 can be substituted by ?̂?, as the study proves that: 
?̂? =  ∑ ?̂?𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=−𝑛
 
After the necessary adjustments, a regression analysis of the share returns is implemented 
against the new market terms which include lagged (one day before), corresponding (the 
actual day) and leading (the following day) values, resulting to a sum of a three-day beta 
coefficient. The new beta that is derived, is used to calculate the expected returns in the way 
that are calculated for infrequent trading and abnormal returns are then extracted. 
The above technique has been used for all the shares that were detected to be infrequently 
traded and for all the aforementioned models (except the market-adjusted model). As it can 
be seen below, the number of parameters has increased in every case, as it has been added 
one factor for the lagged values and one factor for the leading ones. For the index model, the 
abnormal returns are calculated as below: 
𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡] 
             = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,−1𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,0𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,+1𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 − (𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
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The two-factor market model can be easily adjusted for the nonsynchronous trading data. Just 
like the model above, new parameters can be used both for the S&P500 and the S&P500 
Energy Indices. Its equation is: 
𝐴𝑅2𝐹𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃,𝑖,−1𝑅𝑆𝑃500,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃,𝑖,0𝑅𝑆𝑃500,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃,𝑖,+1𝑅𝑆𝑃500,𝑡+1 
                  + 𝛽𝐸𝑁,𝑖,−1𝑅𝑆𝑃500 𝐸𝑁,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑁,𝑖,0𝑅𝑆𝑃500 𝐸𝑁,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑁,𝑖,+1𝑅𝑆𝑃500 𝐸𝑁,𝑡+1 
                  − (𝑎𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑆𝑃,𝑖
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
𝑅𝑆𝑃500,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝐸𝑁,𝑖
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
𝑅𝑆𝑃500 𝐸𝑁,𝑡) 
For the Fama-French-Three-Factor and the Carhart models, the same principle of the 
aggregated coefficients method is applied accordingly. A noticeable change is that the beta 
coefficients are increased quite enough, as now the first model has nine coefficients and the 
second one has twelve. While calculations should be conducted with caution, the rationale is 
still the same. The two following equations present these models in their adjusted form: 
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐹3𝐹 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,−1(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,0(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,+1(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡+1 
               + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖,−1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖,0𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖,+1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1 
               + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖,−1𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖,0𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖,+1𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1 
               −(𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑠,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑣,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
) 
 
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐹4𝐹 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,−1(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,0(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,+1(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡+1 
               + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖,−1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖,0𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑠,𝑖,+1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1 
               + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖,−1𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖,0𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑣,𝑖,+1𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1 
               + 𝑏𝑢,𝑖,−1𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑢,𝑖,0𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑢,𝑖,+1𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 
               −(𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑠,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑣,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
 
                     + ∑ 𝑏𝑢,𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
) 
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The market-adjusted model does not involve any coefficient for its calculation as the abnormal 
returns are calculated as a subtraction from the index return. For nonsynchronous data, the 
observed returns would be equal to the expected ones. Therefore, the abnormal returns and 
their relevant CAR’s would be equal to zero. 
3.3 Second Stage Approach 
 
Event study methodology, generally, is considered a useful research tool in detecting gains 
and losses in company value. Nevertheless, is not without limitations. First, market 
inefficiency cases may appear, as stock prices may not adjust at new upcoming information at 
once. Unforeseen events that have not been considered in the event study, may affect prices 
and result to biased returns. Also, estimation window length can affect the outcome. As the 
optimal period is usually not easy to determine, a researcher should select a period which 
offers a balance between estimation accuracy and parameter swifts. Moreover, the model 
choice can affect the CAAR’s, including their magnitude and their significance. For instance, 
MAR model can produce upwardly biased abnormal returns in a bully market, and 
downwardly returns in a bearish one. Nonsynchronous stocks can also be an issue. Despite 
the methods that a researcher may apply to overcome this problem, returns may not always 
necessarily incorporate new information, according to EMH.  
This information may be possibly captured in various fundamental values. For this reason, the 
CAR results of each i firm, as these are calculated by the MAR model, will be regressed over 
some variables, in order to find if there is significant matching with them. The regression 
equation is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹,𝑖𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑉,𝑖𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑉𝑁𝐷,𝑖𝑅𝑉𝑁𝐷𝑖 
where FOCUS is a dummy variable measuring the effect of diversification and 𝛽𝐹,𝑖 is the 
relevant coefficient. To do this, the data sample is split in two subsamples: one that includes 
all the acquirers and targets that operate both under the same mid-industry, and one if 
otherwise (mid-industry classification is described in the next chapter). In the first case FOCUS 
equals to 1, while in the second case it equals to 0. EPS and EV stand for the earnings-per-
share ratio and the enterprise value, respectively, of the acquiring company, and RVND stands 
for the rank value of the incorporated net debt of the target company. To incorporate greater 
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precision, the next step is to analyze the FOCUS variable even further. This can be achieved by 
replacing it with a number of other dummy variables, one for every mid-industry group. By 
doing this, the above equation will become: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼,𝐹,𝑖𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼,𝐹,𝑖𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐼𝐼𝑖 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑁−1,𝐹,𝑖𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_[𝐾 − 1]𝑖 
                          +𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑉,𝑖𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑉𝑁𝐷,𝑖𝑅𝑉𝑁𝐷𝑖 
where 𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐼 is the dummy variable for the first mid-industry group, 𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐼𝐼 for the 
second group, etc. While the number of groups equals to K, the number of dummy variables 
is K-1, so as to avoid the dummy variable trap. However, one issue that can also affect the 
results, is the degrees of freedom for the above regression. As the sample is substantially split, 
the outcome may be affected by individual values.  
The last component that will be measured for its significance alongside with the fundamentals, 
is the deregulation effect. Just like the diversification effect, deregulation can be measured 
with a dummy variable as well. This means that a cross-sectional regression analysis can be 
run under the relevant equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝐷,𝑖𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑉,𝑖𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑉𝑁𝐷,𝑖𝑅𝑉𝑁𝐷𝑖 
where EVENT is a dummy variable measuring the effect of deregulation acts. This variable is 
equal to 1 if the corresponding company has its headquarters in a state which is fully 
deregulated, and 0 otherwise, while 𝛽𝐷,𝑖 is the relevant coefficient. After all these regressions 
are completed, the p-values of the coefficients will be analyzed, in order to detect which of 
these factors can considered contributing for the abnormal returns. 
However, there is a problem of calendar time clustering, which appears mainly to cases of 
cross-sectional dependence. When the estimation periods of different firms overlap, it 
appears the problem of cross-correlation in the abnormal returns. While, this problem is 
usually dealt by using large sample studies, as they cancel out these effects, in this study, 
because of the limited sample, this issue does not fade away entirely.  
Although t-test is considered one of the most basic statistical tests, is not without drawbacks, 
as it is proven that is prone to induced volatility caused by the studying events (Brown, S.J., 
Warner, J.B., 1980). To overcome this lack of statistical power it is implemented, 
supplementary, a nonparametric test for these particular CAAR’s that were found statistically 
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significant. More specifically, it is used a simple form of the generalized sign test, as this was 
suggested by Cowan who devised it (Cowan, A.R., 1992). This sign test is a simple binomial 
test, used to detect if the frequency of positive abnormal returns is equal to 0.5, as theory 
orders that according to the proper specification of this test, the number of positive and 
negative abnormal returns should be the same, if the event was absent (Brown, S.J., Warner, 
J.B., 1985). The statistic is defined as: 
𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 = √𝑁 (
?̂? − 0.5
√0.5(1 − 0.5)
) 
where N is the number of all the positive and negative CAAR’s (zero CAAR’s are excluded) and 
?̂? is the fraction of positive CAAR’s, as were found in the event window. This statistic is 
considered approximately as normal, with a zero mean and variance of one. If abnormal 
returns are considered independent for all stocks, the null hypotheses claims, that these 
positive values follow a binomial distribution, which must not be significantly different from 
0.5, or more typically: 
𝐻0: 𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 = 0.5 
The alternative hypotheses is: 
𝐻1: 𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ≠ 0.5 
The reason for which generalized sign test is more advantageous than t-test, is that it accounts 
for skewness in security returns. Still, its power and specification, generally, are under 
scrutiny. 
All the above tests are implemented in order to trace a significant connection among the 
acquirers and the targets in a merger deal, as this is depicted by the abnormal returns of the 
latter. In the following chapter, the results of these tests are being presented and discussed. 
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4 Data analysis & Discussion 
 
For the purpose of this study, they have been used the Thomson One Database for sorting out 
the company list, and the Bloomberg Database for collecting the share prices. Regarding the 
selecting process and the identification of the firms that operate in the energy industry, there 
were chosen all the acquiring and target firms of the energy sector of the US market, which 
resided in the US, as these were enlisted in the Thomson One Database. The detecting period 
has been defined from April 30th 2008, up to April 30th 2016. Also, only the acquiring firms that 
have a public status were chosen, so that the impact on their share value can be measured, 
and the ones that, after the transaction, acquired the majority of shares of the target company 
(meaning from 51% up to 100% of the total shares). These requirements resulted to a number 
of 152 deals. After the exclusion of ten deals which the using databases were not provided 
with the necessary data, the final sample consists of 142 deals, which are presented in the 
appendix tables. Also, as there are some cases, where an acquirer announced more than one 
deals in a single day, the total number of CAR’s is 136. 
The classification benchmark that is used is the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) coding, 
and is the system that is used by the US government agencies to categorize different industrial 
sectors. Because a company can use up to four different SIC codes, as its operations may 
involve various industries, for this study it has been used the primary SIC code, which 
represents and the main operation of each firm. The reason for this classification is because it 
is examined whether certain operations of these firms can lead to significant results, or in 
other words whether there are some particular operations that can drive significant abnormal 
returns. These operations, due to many kinds of categorization, there are chosen to be 
depicted, as they are represented by their SIC codes. Due to the limited number of deals, the 
classification resulted in four major CAAR groups: 
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝐼: The first group consists of companies that engage to product creation and 
distribution process and their SIC begins from 0 to 3. This group is formed by these 
firms which significant abnormal returns can be caused as a result of their product-
oriented operations. 
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 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐼: The second group consists of companies that operate under the “1311” SIC 
code, which describes “Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas” operations.  Due to their 
large relative number, they consist a separate category. This occurs in order to detect 
if a certain product-oriented SIC code can produce significant outcomes, or this occurs 
only by a general group as the first one. 
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼: The third group consists of companies that are service-oriented and their SIC 
begins from 4 to 9. These abnormal returns are tested in order to find if their 
significance is driven by their operational orientation or not. 
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑉: The fourth group consists of companies that operate under the “4911” SIC 
code, which describes “Electric Services”. As the second group, they are studied 
separately due to their large number, for individual significance reasons. 
 
4.1 First Stage Results 
 
The first stage includes the results for the cumulative returns, taking into consideration only 
the acquiring companies. The results are presented, considering both synchronous and whole-
sample returns, the robustness checking and the appliance of the aggregated coefficients 
method. 
Regarding the returns of the first stage, table 1 contains all the results as these were found in 
the MAR model. In this first approach, all the share returns were calculated under the 
assumption of regular trading. If all shares are considered to be traded frequently, then there 
are found significant results in the first, third and fourth group. Also, there are found 
significant results in all four detecting periods. Moreover, most of these results are found to 
be positive, meaning that the merger announcement probably contributed to value creation 
for the shares. However, in the fourth group there are found two significant negative results 
in the 95th percentile. For these two cases, the announcement had probably a negative impact 
on the shares. As these two cumulative returns involve the two event windows with the 
biggest length, the volatility of the returns makes a significant impact. As for the group 
comparison, groups one and three are found to have positive cumulative returns, in 
contradiction with the usual findings in the literature, and only the fourth group has negative 
results that comply with the relevant studies. 
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Table 1: Group returns with MAR model assuming frequent trading  1 
CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
Number of 
deals 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈 29 
0,93% ** 
(2,1477) 
-0,75% 
(-0,3091) 
1,89% ** 
(1,9732) 
1,07% 
(0,2877) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈 40 
0,81% 
(-0,7323) 
-3,00% 
(-1,2939) 
0,91% 
(0,4491) 
-5,50% 
(-1,2614) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈𝐈 43 
1,63% *** 
(2,5818) 
5,04% ** 
(1,9244) 
1,80% ** 
(2,4097) 
4,26% 
(1,6063) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐕 24 
2,01% * 
(1,7428) 
-3,91% ** 
(-1,9917) 
1,32% 
(1,0784) 
-6,52% ** 
(-2,1929) 
 
Total CAAR 136 
0,83% * 
(1,8743) 
-0,14% 
(-0,1104) 
1,47% ** 
(2,1158) 
-1,19% 
(-0,6611) 
 
 
However, treating all shares as regularly traded can lead to miscalculations. To deal with this 
issue, the CAAR returns of each group can be recalculated, where this time the 
nonsynchronous firms will be excluded. After this amendment, for once again is the first, third 
and fourth group that appear significant returns, in table 2. In the first group, there are found 
positive returns for the same periods as in the first case, however they are almost doubled. 
The third group also appears positive returns in three out of four periods, one in each of the 
three confidence levels. As for the third group, there are found two negative returns in the 
two largest periods and one positive for the period of five days after the announcement. The 
difference in the magnitude between two measurements, can be justified by the assumption 
of the first case. There, as all firms were considered to be traded for every trading day, the 
returns for these days were zero. As a result, the final numbers can be considered as zero-
mean biased, and thus closer to zero, than the figures in table 2. Still, the signing remains 
constant in all cases, under the adjustment of confidence levels. Therefore, firms in groups 
one and three are rather benefited from the announcement, while the fourth group’s firms 
                                                          
1 Notes: (*) describes the results that are found significant at the 90th percentile, (**) for significant results at the 95th 
percentile, and (***) for significant results at the 99th percentile. The numbers in parentheses are the relevant t-values. 
This quotation stands for all tables, unless reported differently. 
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enjoy positive returns only in short term and loss in the longer run. As for the second group, 
the change in value creation can mostly be attributed to chance or in other factors, besides 
the announcement. 
Table 2: Group returns with MAR model after excluding nonsynchronous firms 
CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
Number of 
deals 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈 14 
1,93% *** 
(3,0871) 
-1,56% 
(-0,4040) 
3,93% *** 
(2,7901) 
2,21% 
(0,3759) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈 29 
-1,11% 
(-0,7287) 
-4,14% 
(-1,2876) 
1,25% 
(0,4469) 
-7,58% 
(-1,2553) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈𝐈 29 
2,42% *** 
(2,6713) 
7,48% * 
(1,9554) 
2,67% ** 
(2,4800) 
6,31% 
(1,6212) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐕 21 
2,29% * 
(1,7924) 
-4,47% ** 
(-2,0548) 
1,50% 
(1,1023) 
-7,45% ** 
(-2,2688) 
 
Total CAAR 93 
1,22% * 
(1,9026) 
-0,20% 
(-0,1114) 
2,15% ** 
(2,1513) 
-1,75% 
(-0,6675) 
 
 
The next step is to check the returns with the aggregated coefficients method. As table 3 
presents, this time the results show an important differentiation from the first two tables. In 
this case all four groups have significant results. The first and the third group have positive 
significant results, the second has significant negative results, while the fourth one appears 
mixed results, depending on the event window. This means that a group just like the first one 
which contains various SIC codes, has better performance compared with a group with only 
one SIC code. However, a single-SIC-code group is not always a choice with a negative effect. 
For instance, for a period of five days before and after the announcement, the fourth group 
appears small, but significant positive returns. Probably the diversification effect, as this is 
implemented in the SIC coding, appears here.   
Nevertheless, the most important finding in this case, is the magnitude of the cumulative 
returns. The most profound evidence for this is appeared in the returns of the first and third 
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group, where the significant results are substantially bigger, compared with the respective 
ones in tables 1 and 2. Here, the returns contradict with the literature findings and show that 
an announcement can lead to value creation for the shareholders of the acquiring companies. 
Still, for the firms of groups two and four, the announcement concludes to value decline, 
meaning that firms engaging in petroleum and gas operations, as well as in electric services 
verify the findings of the common literature that market participants appear a defensive 
image to merger announcements. 
The reason for this magnitude, most probably lies in the implementation of the aggregated 
coefficients method. In the first case, the returns were calculated by a simple subtraction of 
the share returns from the index returns. However, this did not apply for all the shares, as they 
did not encompass the features of the EMH, under which the US market can be considered to 
operate. In addition, this method includes partially the market risk, as this is represented by 
the alpha and beta coefficients. This means that for a firm which shares did not frequently 
trade, the market appreciated a significant positive or negative cumulative abnormal return. 
Therefore, the impact for these firms that had nonsynchronous shares, under a single event 
like a deal announcement, constituted a critical factor in the information symmetry (in the 
EMH), which resulted to a substantial change in the share prices. This would conclude that 
market participants considered that due to the deal announcement, the acquiring firm 
improved its financial outlook and attempted to realize future growth, which led to positive 
abnormal returns, or considered that the outlook of the firm will be worsen. In this situation, 
which is and the most common one, according to the relevant literature, the market 
participants avoided to reward this choice, leading its share value to decline. There, the latter 
firms were found to underperform the market.  
Still, the length of the event window appears to be an important factor. In the first group, 
three out of four windows have significant returns, though two of them is at the lowest 
confidence level. The second group has significant results for the two longest periods at the 
90th percentile. On the other hand, in the third group, the two smallest windows are the ones 
that contain the significant results. However, the mixed results of the fourth group engage 
both a short window of five days before and after the announcement, as well as a window of 
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forty days after the announcement. Therefore, for each group the detecting period and the 
confidence level of the significant returns vary accordingly. 
Table 3: Group returns with MAR model under the aggregated coefficients method  
CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
Number of 
deals 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈 29 
13,18% ** 
(2,0142) 
14,58% * 
(1,7246) 
8,17% * 
(1,6579) 
7,96% 
(0,8361) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈 40 
2,90% 
(0,9116) 
-15,03% * 
(-1,8750) 
2,74% 
(1,2227) 
-15,39% * 
(-1,9293) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈𝐈 43 
4,54% *** 
(2,6350) 
3,49% 
(1,0016) 
8,17% ** 
(2,4885) 
4,92% 
(0,2619) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐕 24 
1,66% 
(1,0091) 
-4,59% ** 
(-2,1070) 
3,15% * 
(1,8055) 
-0,55% 
(-0,0828) 
 
Total CAAR 136 
5,39% *** 
(3,0605) 
-1,02% 
(-0,3167) 
5,69% *** 
(3,4715) 
-1,95% 
(-0,5500) 
 
 
In order to examine the accuracy of these figures, a robustness check is implemented for table 
2 results. As table 4 presents, the models with the most significant returns are found in the 
first and the third group. There, all tested models appear significant results, for different 
confidence levels, either for a period of five days after the announcement or five prior and 
after the announcement. This means that the components of these models, do not constitute 
a significant impact to the abnormal returns on a long term. Results are poorer in the case of 
the second and fourth group. There, only MM and 2FMM were found significant while three 
out of four of them were for the long-length windows. This means that the abnormal returns 
were affected only by the market factors and at the 90th percentile.  
Regarding the comparison with the numbers in table 2, first group does not appear to diverge 
importantly, as in both window lengths they have similar figures. In the second group, most 
results are still insignificantly negative. While here there are also found some significant 
negative results (two of them show a value destruction of more than a tenth in the total value 
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in the long run), most models here remain weak in interpreting abnormal returns. In the third 
group, all returns were found positive with more than half of them to be significant in all 
window periods except of the one of forty days prior and after the announcement. The 
magnitude is similar to the one with the figures in table 2. In the fourth group, only one case 
is found to be significantly important, the one in market model for the first period. This finding 
contradicts not only with the respective numbers in the MAR model, but also it is a significantly 
positive return, which does not comply with the literature findings. As for the other models, 
they do not seem to explain any significant return for the rest of the CAAR figures in this 
model, and thus any value creation or value destruction may be attributed to other factors, 
besides the ones that consist the tested formulas.  
Table 4: Group returns for robustness checking excluding nonsynchronous firms 
 CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈 (14 deals) 
MM 
1,91% *** 
(2,7068) 
1,09% 
(0,1952) 
4,33% *** 
(3,1644) 
10,08% 
(1,1281) 
2FMM 
2,16% ** 
(2,3958) 
2,30% 
(0,4127) 
4,23% *** 
(3,0072) 
9,32% 
(1,0536) 
FF3F 
1,74% *** 
(2,6996) 
1,66% 
(0,2987) 
4,06% *** 
(2,7366) 
10,05% 
(1,1490) 
FF4F 
1,58% ** 
(2,3599) 
0,23% 
(0,0393) 
3,84% ** 
(2,5498) 
10,91% 
(1,2301) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈 (29 deals) 
MM 
-1,16% 
(-0,7000) 
-5,26% * 
(-1,9531) 
1,19% 
(0,3134) 
-10,69% * 
(-1,6624) 
2FMM 
-1,40% 
(-0,8051) 
-3,31% 
(-1,2924) 
1,05% 
(0,2837) 
-10,36% * 
(-1,6754) 
FF3F 
-1,10% 
(-0,7310) 
-3,42% 
(-1,2544) 
1,22% 
(0,3406) 
-10,18% 
(-1,6031) 
FF4F 
-0,72% 
(-0,4628) 
-1,60% 
(-0,5713) 
1,94% 
(0,5691) 
-7,33% 
(-1,1159) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈𝐈 (29 deals) 
MM 
2,29% ** 
(2,3940) 
6,00% 
(1,5371) 
2,37% ** 
(2,0131) 
2,77% 
(0,6076) 
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2FMM 
2,30% ** 
(2,3526) 
5,84% 
(1,5110) 
2,24% * 
(1,8111) 
2,61% 
(0,5592) 
FF3F 
1,73% ** 
(1,9792) 
6,37% * 
(1,6751) 
2,26% ** 
(2,0607) 
2,89% 
(0,6540) 
FF4F 
1,60% * 
(1,7849) 
6,06% 
(1,6234) 
2,04% * 
(1,7389) 
2,57% 
(0,5783) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐕 (21 deals) 
MM 
1,98% * 
(1,6891) 
-0,65% 
(-0,3440) 
1,45% 
(1,0781) 
-2,84% 
(-0,6907) 
2FMM 
1,87% 
(1,6340) 
0,12% 
(0,0646) 
1,42% 
(1,0651) 
-2,35% 
(-0,6216) 
FF3F 
0,73% 
(0,7064) 
-0,34% 
(-0,1889) 
0,52% 
(0,4850) 
-1,61% 
(-0,4267) 
FF4F 
0,64% 
(0,6021) 
-0,90% 
(-0,4716) 
0,25% 
(0,2063) 
-2,94% 
(-0,7707) 
 
However, in order to test the credibility of the aggregated coefficients method for the MAR 
model, a robustness check has been reattempted, including this time the nonsynchronous 
firms and their returns, as they have been estimated under the Dimson’s method in table 3. 
In this case, in the first group, there are found significant results in the MM for two short 
periods around the announcement, and two results in the long detecting period in each of 
FF3F and FF4F models. Compared with the previous results, it seems that aggregated 
coefficients method enlarges the magnitude of the returns, however in smallest confidence 
levels. In the second group, only the market model returns significant results. These results 
are similar to the respective ones in table 4, and reserve both the magnitude and the signing. 
In the third group, there are found significant positive results in all models, which is similar to 
the results of the previous table. But in this case, there are found less significant results at the 
95th percentile. FF3F and FF4F models have fewer significant results in this group, meaning 
that their components do not contribute that much under the inclusion of nonsynchronous 
firms and Dimson’s method. In the fourth group, there are found both negative and positive 
returns, yet all insignificant, which is similar to the respective results of the table 4. Table 5 
presents these results. 
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Table 5: Group returns for robustness checking with aggregated coefficients method  
 CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈 (29 deals) 
MM 
1,24% * 
(1,7467) 
-1,60% 
(-0,3558) 
2,39% ** 
(2,1076) 
-5,33% 
(-0,8270) 
2FMM 
0,86% 
(0,8748) 
-1,85% 
(-0,3720) 
0,53% 
(0,3575) 
1,07% 
(0,1715) 
FF3F 
1,88% 
(1,5082) 
6,44% 
(1,3886) 
2,76% 
(1,6255) 
14,34% * 
(1,6633) 
FF4F 
0,95% 
(0,7954) 
3,88% 
(0,8551) 
1,58% 
(0,6329) 
15,24% * 
(1,9087) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈 (40 deals) 
MM 
-0,78% 
(-0,6321) 
-3,95% ** 
(-2,0079) 
0,93% 
(0,3377) 
-11,31% * 
(-1,8342) 
2FMM 
-0,66% 
(-0,4689) 
-3,07% 
(-1,5795) 
1,11% 
(0,4040) 
-7,50% 
(-1,6059) 
FF3F 
0,55% 
(0,3556) 
-2,42% 
(-0,9904) 
2,42% 
(0,8726) 
-6,37% 
(-1,1585) 
FF4F 
-0,55% 
(-0,4340) 
-1,52% 
(-0,7074) 
2,44% 
(0,9386) 
-4,39% 
(-0,8789) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈𝐈 (43 deals) 
MM 
1,58% ** 
(2,3322) 
4,24% 
(1,5825) 
1,53% * 
(1,8203) 
2,57% 
(0,8355) 
2FMM 
1,49% * 
(1,8033) 
5,55% * 
(1,9026) 
1,23% 
(1,1933) 
3,71% 
(1,1291) 
FF3F 
1,54% ** 
(2,0525) 
5,76% * 
(1,7575) 
1,56% 
(1,2733) 
3,57% 
(1,1144) 
FF4F 
0,86% 
(1,0572) 
5,23% * 
(1,9540) 
0,79% 
(0,5051) 
0,00% 
(-0,0009) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐕 (24 deals) 
MM 
1,56% 
(1,4141) 
0,26% 
(0,1429) 
0,32% 
(0,2014) 
-2,18% 
(-0,5998) 
2FMM 
1,51% 
(1,3818) 
0,07% 
(0,0400) 
0,77% 
(0,5884) 
-2,82% 
(-0,7823) 
FF3F 
1,04% 
(1,0474) 
-2,10% 
(-0,9356) 
1,05% 
(0,8327) 
-2,25% 
(-0,6546) 
FF4F 0,42% -2,53% 0,41% -3,71% 
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(0,4349) (-1,1998) (0,3456) (-1,0822) 
 
Regarding the literature findings, the results are mixed. In the first and in the third group, 
there are found significantly positive returns, when in the second and the fourth group are 
found significantly negative returns. Only the two latter cases are consistent with D. Faulkner’s 
results. However, there are also found many insignificant positive results that also agree with 
Faulkner. Still, the significant positive results can be explained with the findings of J. Harford 
who finds evidence of higher premiums for bidders in a merger wave, compared with the non-
wave bidders. While MAR and market model explain most of the significant returns, the FF3F 
model return for the third group can match the findings of M. Rhodes-Kropf and S. 
Viswanathan, who found that firms with high market-to-book ratios outperform firms with 
low book-to-market ratios.  
Conclusively, for two situations, it seems that the inclusion of the zero-return MAR firms, can 
affect the significance and the respective periods for each group. This can be attributed to the 
fact that the event study methodology is applied under the assumption of EMH, where new 
information affects instantly the share prices. In non-regularly traded shares this does not 
seem to stand. As a result, this methodology can lead to insignificant results, despite the usage 
of the aggregated coefficients method. Also, there are found some CAAR results where the 
level of (logarithmic) returns, exceeded 100% or -100%. This magnitude can be explained by 
the limitations of the implemented methods, along with the benchmark selection issue. As 
many of these firms, due to their small capitalization are not components of the selected 
indices, they fail to follow them consistently, while their alpha and beta coefficients are 
extremely low. However, it should be noted that in groups 1, 3 and 4, signing is consistent: 
groups 1 and 3 are characterized by positive returns and group 4 by negative ones, in both 
situations. Also, in both situations MAR and market models seem to explain the results. This 
means that in MAR model, firms follow the market with a zero alpha and a beta coefficient 
equal to one. Market model for excluded firms (with zero returns) verify these results at least 
for one variable: in all CAAR periods alpha was found either -0.0001 or 0 (approximately 
rounded) and beta was found 0.8127 for CAAR(0,5) and CAAR(0,40), 0.8140 for CAAR(-5,5) 
and 0.7981 for CAAR(-40,40). 
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Comparing these results with nonsynchronous ones, and with the ones in the previously 
discussed situations, the signing consistency holds. The detected periods, however, change. 
This leads to the conclusion that the assumptions under which index model is implemented, 
can be rendered important. These assumptions affect the variation in share prices, and 
respectively, the variation of the returns. This way, insufficient variation in dependent 
variables can conclude to insignificant results affecting the accumulated returns’ levels. As for 
the comparison with the literature, the mixed results can be explained partially, by the small 
sample. As the literature refers to total market merger deals, and this study contains only a 
part of them, for a specific sector and period, there can be raised issues regarding the volatility 
of the prices, or in the case of thinly traded stocks, about the normality of the returns. The 
findings of T. Bednarczyk, D. Schiereck, and H. Walter, are consistent with the groups 1 and 3, 
as the industry relatedness of the acquired energy assets has positive results, compared with 
the groups 2 and 4 where results are negative or insignificant. 
4.2 Second Stage Results 
 
In the second stage, numerous variables are tested for their significance along with the 
cumulative average abnormal returns of all companies. Next, the nonparametric test is 
implemented and the cases which results were found significant in all tests will be analyzed 
to their relevant acquirer-target combinations.  
Table 6 presents the coefficient results and their p-values, after splitting the data sample in 
two sub-samples: one containing acquiring and target companies which share the same SIC 
code, and one containing the rest. According to this table, all but two coefficients were not 
found contributing to the formation of cumulative returns. Earnings-per-share ratio, 
enterprise value and risk value do not affect abnormal returns during announcement date. 
Market participants seem unaffected, regarding their decisions, by the levels of these figures 
and design their strategies taking into consideration other features. The focus variable, 
however, is found significant in the CAAR(0,40) and CAAR(-5,5) periods. For a short period 
around the announcement, markets are driven, partially, on whether these firms operate in 
the same industry. While this characteristic can also be found in a period of forty days after 
the announcement, markets appreciate significantly, though negatively, an association of 
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targets and acquirers. This contradicts the findings of N. Huyghebaert and M. Luypaert, who 
found positive returns for a similar period. As their study was about European countries, the 
horizontal acquisitions in this particular region, appears to drive positive abnormal returns. In 
the US market though, findings are opposite, as a result of a most efficient, integrated market. 
Table 6: Coefficient results of acquiring and target companies operating under the same 
SIC code 
 CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
EPS -0,0059 -0,0035 0,0018 0,0102 
 (0,1724) (0,6543) (0,6444) (0,2399) 
EV 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 (0,6218) (0,8841) (0,2762) (0,9343) 
RVND 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 (0,4002) (0,7089) (0,6284) (0,9052) 
FOCUS -0,0480 -0,1384 -0,0669 -0,0949 
 (0,1781) (0,0345) (0,0435) (0,1877) 
 
Moving on, the next step is to examine whether this significance of the focus variable can be 
attributed to all different CAAR groups or not. Therefore, this variable is split into four others, 
each for a particular CAAR group. The next table presents the relevant results. It seems that 
the group classification does not amount to any significant result. None of the variables is 
found significant, perhaps with the exception of a marginally insignificant result for the first 
focus variable. Nevertheless, this further classification of the acquiring firms according to their 
operations, cannot be considered to assist in finding significant results. Hence, the markets 
can be considered to be driven only by general characteristics, i.e. if both target and acquiring 
firm in a deal, share similar operations, in deals of horizontal or vertical integration purposes, 
this can be helpful. Table 7 presents these results. 
Table 7: Coefficient results of acquiring and target companies operating in the same mid-
industry group 
 CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
EPS -0,0048 -0,0030 0,0021 0,0100 
 (0,2721) (0,7008) (0,6053) (0,2547) 
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EV 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 (0,4042) (0,8746) (0,2483) (0,8018) 
RVND 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 (0,5732) (0,7422) (0,5840) (0,8895) 
FOCUS_I 0,1118 0,1871 0,0534 0,0934 
 (0,0509) (0,0697) (0,3209) (0,4159) 
FOCUS_II 0,0050 -0,1094 -0,0046 -0,1396 
 (0,9243) (0,2515) (0,9263) (0,1922) 
FOCUS_III 0,0357 0,0861 0,0511 0,0296 
 (0,4948) (0,3610) (0,3011) (0,7788) 
FOCUS_IV 0,0340 -0,0351 0,0396 -0,0158 
 (0,4249) (0,6477) (0,3257) (0,8540) 
 
Still, this situation does not improve by the measuring of deregulation. Despite that 
deregulation is considered a factor that drives merger deals, in this situation was not found 
contributing. This means that for the energy firms in the US market, deregulation is not an 
assisting factor for abnormal returns. While this can be attributed to the small data sample or 
to the nonsynchronous shares, reader should also consider the nature of this particular 
industry. Utilities, in the US market which are considered capital-intensive, have probably 
been affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis, must have therefore neutralized any 
positive effect on the abnormal returns of these deals. Hence, time period of this study could 
be important for obtaining results for this industry. The results and their respective p-values 
are presented in table 8. 
Table 8: Coefficient results for acquiring companies listed in a deregulated state 
 CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
EPS -0,0059 -0,0030 0,0020 0,0114 
 (0,1760) (0,7105) (0,6194) (0,1938) 
EV 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 (0,5704) (0,9655) (0,2383) (0,9053) 
RVND 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 (0,4218) (-0,7378) (0,6604) (0,8995) 
EVENT -0,0352 -0,0700 -0,0394 0,0007 
 (0,3257) (0,2904) (0,2388) (0,9920) 
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As the above variables were not found to contribute to cumulative returns, a nonparametric 
test could assist on obtaining some extra results. Table 9 shows that in the first group there 
are found two results which number of firms with positive returns do not differentiate 
significantly from the number of negative ones. Similar results can be obtained for the third 
and fourth group with two and one result, respectively. Regarding robustness check, the FF3F 
verifies the relevant results for the first group, while in the second group, any significant 
outcomes through robustness check does not depict in the MAR model. The exact opposite 
outcome occurs in the last two groups, as it was only the MAR model that returned significant 
p-values. While this nonparametric test does not offer any information about the ranking of 
the deal values, it is still one supplementary component of this dissertation that informs 
readers for the inclination of the deals from the average values. 
Table 9: Group results for the nonparametric test 
 CAAR(0,5) CAAR(0,40) CAAR(-5,5) CAAR(-40,40) 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈 (29 deals) 
MAR Model 2,0426 0,5571 2,0426 1,2999 
 (0,0373) (0,2528) (0,0373) (0,1289) 
MM 0,9285 0,5571 0,9285 0,9285 
 (0,1933) (0,2528) (0,1933) (0,1933) 
2FMM 0,9285 0,1857 0,5571 0,5571 
 (0,1933) (0,2889) (0,2528) (0,2528) 
FF3F 2,6458 0,9285 2,0426 1,6713 
 (0,0088) (0,1933) (0,0373) (0,0746) 
FF4F 1,2999 0,9285 0,9285 1,6713 
 (0,1289) (0,1933) (0,1933) (0,0746) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈 (40 deals) 
MAR Model 0,6325 1,2649 0,0000 1,2649 
 (0,2062) (0,1143) (0,2507) (0,1143) 
MM 1,1209 0,3162 1,8974 0,8108 
 (0,1372) (0,2388) (0,0422) (0,1856) 
2FMM 1,4412 0,3162 1,2649 1,7614 
 (0,0915) (0,2388) (0,1143) (0,0549) 
FF3F 0,3162 0,9487 1,2649 2,0817 
 (0,2388) (0,1614) (0,1143) (0,0295) 
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FF4F 0,8006 0,1601 0,6325 1,1352 
 (0,1856) (0,2507) (0,2062) (0,1372) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐈𝐈 (43 deals) 
MAR Model 1,9825 1,6775 2,8975 0,7625 
 (0,0345) (0,0603) (0,0035) (0,1820) 
MM 0,6172 1,3725 0,7625 0,1525 
 (0,2032) (0,0958) (0,1820) (0,2392) 
2FMM 1,0675 1,6775 0,4575 0,1525 
 (0,1383) (0,0603) (0,2184) (0,2392) 
FF3F 1,4056 1,3725 1,3725 0,7625 
 (0,0937) (0,0958) (0,0958) (0,1820) 
FF4F 0,7625 1,3725 1,3725 0,7625 
 (0,1820) (0,0958) (0,0958) (0,1820) 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐕 (24 deals) 
MAR Model 0,4082 1,6330 2,0412 1,6330 
 (0,2976) (0,0877) (0,0413) (0,0877) 
MM 0,8165 0,4082 0,8165 1,1990 
 (0,2338) (0,2976) (0,2338) (0,1559) 
2FMM 0,8165 0,4082 0,8165 1,2247 
 (0,2338) (0,2976) (0,2338) (0,1559) 
FF3F 0,8165 0,4082 1,2247 1,6330 
 (0,2338) (0,2976) (0,1559) (0,0877) 
FF4F 0,0000 1,2247 0,4082 1,8766 
 (0,3224) (0,1559) (0,2976) (0,0584) 
 
All the significant findings are now accumulated and presented in a single table. Table 10 
presents these findings and also matches the acquirers with their targets. For each acquirer’s 
group is presented the respective target’s group (which classification is identical to the former 
one, i.e. the CAARI of the target group includes all target firms that operate under a SIC code 
that begins from 0 to 3, etc.), the returns and their significance. According to this matching, 
only two results are still found significant: the combination of acquiring and target companies 
that both operate in the third group for a period of five days after the announcement (8,02%, 
significant at the 95th percentile), and for a period of five days prior and after the 
announcement (10,40%, significant at the 90th percentile). 
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Table 10: Combinations of acquirers' and targets' groups in the MAR model 
Period 
Acquirers’ 
group 
Targets’ 
group 
Cumulative 
Returns 
t-stat 
Number 
of deals 
(0,5) CAARI CAARI 5,23% 0,3531 13 
  CAARII 18,65% 0,5602 6 
  CAARIII 70,92% 0,4836 5 
  CAARIV -1,48% -0,0370 5 
(0,5) CAARIII CAARI 0,71% 0,0502 6 
  CAARII 1,17% 0,0992 7 
  CAARIII 8,02% ** 2,3256 20 
  CAARIV 2,32% 0,2949 10 
(-5,5) CAARIII CAARI 3,39% 0,1298 6 
  CAARII 19,04% 0,7876 7 
  CAARIII 10,40% * 1,6677 20 
  CAARIV 4,92% 0,2619 10 
 
Although the number of the deals is small, the above results can be considered partially 
consistent with the literature findings. Deregulation although it was not found significant, 
creates a merger wave in which acquiring firms can perform significantly positive. This is 
consistent with the findings of Mitchell and Mulherin who found that in a deregulatory shock, 
returns can be higher for bidders. As table 10 shows, for the third group results are not only 
not negative but can also be significantly positive. This is also consistent with the findings of 
Harford, whose results showed high returns for bidders in a wave. However, the results cannot 
be considered fully consistent with the ones of Ahern, who found that the party with the 
scarcer products, enjoys the greater gains. Here, both parties operate in the same group and 
thus more research is suggested. 
The most interesting fact is that both significant returns are found, under the appliance of this 
method to be positive, which is in contradiction with the findings of the common literature. 
However, it should be noted that the number of the respective deals is relatively small, which 
can affect the validity of the final results. The numbers are also affected by the effectiveness 
of the applied tests which readers should take into account. The next chapter presents the 
final conclusions.  
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5 Conclusions 
 
This dissertation had as a purpose to define whether a combination of acquiring and target 
companies according to their operating classification can lead to significant share returns of 
the former ones. At first it was attempted to consider only the acquiring firms in the days 
during the announcement. There, were found mixed results, according to the literature 
findings, as in two out of four cases appeared significantly positive results, while in the other 
two there were found significantly negative results, as literature findings order. In the second 
stage there were examined various factors. Earnings-per-share ratio and enterprise value of 
the acquiring company and risk value of net debt of the target company were found 
insignificant. There were found evidence that in some cases, if both companies operate under 
the same SIC code, this can affect the acquirers’ returns. However, further expansion of SIC 
segmentation does not return significant results. Deregulation variable was also found 
insignificant. After the appliance of a nonparametric test, there were found results, significant 
in both tests. Specifically, there were found a return of 8.02% for a cumulative period of five 
days, and a return of 10.40% for a cumulative period of five days before and after the 
announcement, for acquiring and target firms that both operate under a SIC code starting 
from 4 to 9, which include service-oriented operations, like transportation and wholesale. 
Event study methodology has been used for this thesis, however is not without limitations. 
The greatest criticism has to do with the fact that it is a measurement of ex-ante performance 
and not ex-post. This means that it is not the actual performance that it is measured, rather 
than the expectations of the investors, as these are described by the efficient market 
hypotheses, something that researchers should be aware of. In addition, this methodology 
measures only the financial performance of the event, and does not consider further factors 
that may have an influential impact for the company, like the integration process. Another 
limitation is about the firm status, as it can be applied only to public listed companies and not 
private ones. Finally, the results can differentiate according to the standards that are used. 
The lengths of the estimation and event windows, and the model that are used, can influence 
the results. This last reason, is the cause of employing robustness checks, as these can result 
to critical outcomes maintaining the scientific approach at a reputable level. Still, MAR and 
  
44 
 
market model, despite their deficiencies, are proven capable of explaining most of the results, 
for the checked periods, demonstrating this way, their efficiency over other, more 
sophisticated models.  
Nevertheless, the inherent limitations of the CAR’s should not be neglected. Although many 
conducted studies have found consisting results where CAR’s are associated with long-term 
performance in the post-deal period, it should be noted that these results measure the market 
expectations about the firm performance, and not realised returns. This is actually and the 
reason for selecting the particular title for this study. Besides, quoting M. Zollo and D. Meier: 
“CAR’s gauge the collective cognitive heuristic, the overall market sentiment about how a 
given typology of acquisitions should perform” (Zollo, M., Meier, D., 2008). As for the 
nonparametric test there also some limitations like time clustering. Also, it does not give any 
ranking valuable results. Hence, the implementation of other nonparametric tests, alone or 
combined with event study methodology is suggested for future studies, according to the 
needs of each separate case. 
It is suggested for event studies to select the period which has the most normal returns as the 
bias would be the least possible. It is also suggested to avoid generalize random samples to 
non-random ones, as a biased statistical error could appear, resulted from the abnormal 
returns of the announcement day. The economic repercussions would be relevant to the level 
of the abnormal returns. The main factors that contribute to an economically significant bias 
are found to be high market-to-book ratios, and low market equity and premiums, of 
companies that engage to unsuccessful deals.  
The connection between market conditions and market’s response on a deal announcement 
(merger momentum effect), seem also to be important. The outcome of the deal depends on 
the outcome of other recent deals. There are also evidence that high market evaluations lead 
to short-run positive returns and high likelihood of merger momentum in periods of 
overvalued market (Antoniou, A., Jie, G., Petmezas, D., 2008). Investors’ optimism should also 
not be neglected, as it is more probable in these periods. Therefore, mergers can be related 
to behavioural biases during high evaluation periods, causing merger wave deals. These deals 
have the tendency to correlate each other, moving towards same levels. In addition, the 
market assumptions under which abnormal returns are extracted, are also important. 
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Although event studies are applied usually under the EMH, this in fact may not stand. For 
particular industries and firms, semi-strong EMH form where prices are adjusted to public 
information may be proven inadequate and prices may be affected only by market data (as in 
the case of a weak EMH form) or, even by all available data (strong EMH form). Finally, market 
anomalies like the weekend effect may also have a significant role.  
In extension of the usual measures, it should not be ignored that M&A’s consist of an event, 
its consequences of which, affect the entire firm. Hence, due to M&A’s multidimensional 
construct, it is suggested the measurement of multiple criteria in the relevant studies. 
Moreover, new measures could be devised for measuring M&A performance that take into 
consideration multiple stakeholders that are affected by the deal. Apart of event studies, mid-
industry effect can possibly be studied under different approaches. For instance, the 
accounting based performance, despite its own limitations, remains one of the major 
methodological approaches and could be used for this purpose. Divestiture could be another. 
As it is not uncommon to occur, divestitures may be proven to have a significant effect for 
deals among companies of the same industry. Along with the above, the effect of integration 
process and how this affects the performance of the acquiring companies, could also have a 
critical impact. As the value creation takes place after the acquisition, this factor, either 
studied alone or combined with one or more of the above, could lead to useful evidence. 
Conclusively, as an advice, it is suggested that any practitioner or researcher should be in place 
to evaluate the outcomes of the deal as better as possible. Market value creation should be 
the first to come in mind when an M&A deal is attempted, followed by financial stability. The 
team responsible for conducting the deal has, therefore, to consider shareholders’ 
perspective and alongside improving firm’s strategic position. If the deal conductors fail to 
enhance new capabilities for the new deal, the new company has not necessarily 
strengthened its market position. Only this way, the firm will be able to reinforce its 
organizational strength and improve the process through which will attempt future deals. In 
the end, any deal can be considered as a system: it should be internally consistent, matching 
all put-in variables with the put-out ones in a reasonable way, take into consideration that 
unanticipated effects can occur, as the exhausting scrutiny of a factor can lead severe issues 
on another, and above all, have in mind that there is not always a single right answer to 
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operate a deal. As the objectives of a deal can be satisfied in more than one way, the possible 
ways to operate a deal, can be various. The acknowledgment of choice and the capable 
distinction of good and bad choices is the key for an optimally successful deal.    
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Appendix 
 
The appendix includes the names of the acquiring and target companies that had been used 
for this dissertation thesis, as these have been derived by the Thomson One Database. It 
contains four tables, one for each group, as these have been discussed in chapter 4. The first 
column includes the dates when the merger deals had been announced. The second column 
includes the names of the acquiring companies followed by their respective primary SIC code, 
in the third column. Finally, in the fourth and fifth columns there are presented the names of 
the target companies and their SIC codes, respectively.  
 
First Group 
Announcement 
date 
Acquiring Company 
SIC 
(acq.) 
Target Company 
SIC 
(tar.) 
02/01/2016 Renewable Energy Group Inc 2869 Sanimax Energy LLC-Biodiesel 5172 
12/05/2014 Cypress Energy Partners LP 1389 SBG Energy Svcs LLC-facility 4953 
11/12/2014 RDX Technologies Corp 1389 M2 Renewables Inc 4941 
09/09/2014 Biopower Operations Corp 100 Green3Power Holdings Co 4911 
07/15/2014 RDX Technologies Corp 1389 Renewable Energy Products LLC 2911 
04/10/2014 CanTex Energy Corp 1382 Arkose Energy Inc 1311 
11/04/2013 Steel Excel Inc 1389 Black Hawk Energy Services Inc 1389 
05/03/2013 Renewable Energy Group Inc 2860 Soy Energy LLC-Biodiesel Plant 2869 
04/26/2013 CUB Energy Inc 1382 Anatolia Energy Corp 1311 
03/20/2013 Global Clean Energy Inc 2860 MicroEnergies LLC 3823 
08/20/2012 FMC Technologies Inc 3533 Pure Energy Services Ltd 1389 
06/05/2012 3Power Energy Corp 3510 Shala Energy SHPK 4911 
11/02/2011 CVR Energy Inc 2911 Gary-Williams Energy Corp 5172 
07/11/2011 Legend Oil & Gas Ltd 1381 Intl Sovereign Energy-Land 1311 
05/13/2011 3Power Energy Group Inc 3510 Seawind Energy Ltd 3511 
07/12/2010 Quad Energy Corp 1382 Bluegrass Energy Inc- Cave 1311 
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11/09/2010 Chevron Corp 2911 Atlas Energy Inc 1311 
11/08/2010 Mustang Geothermal Corp 1000 Andean Geothermic Energy SAC 4961 
09/07/2010 Chevron Corp 2911 Devon Energy Corp-Blocks 1311 
07/26/2010 Key Energy Services Inc (3x) 1389 Davis Energy Services LLC,         
Swan Energy Svcs LLC,       
QCP Energy Svcs LLC 
1382, 
4922, 
1382 
07/14/2010 GeoBio Energy Inc 2860 Magna Energy Services LLC 1389 
07/06/2010 Patterson-UTI Energy Inc 1381 Key Energy Services Inc-Assets 1389 
03/03/2010 Alternative Energy Partners 2860 Sunarias Corp 4911 
01/14/2010 Titan Energy Worldwide Inc 3612 Sustainable Solutions Inc 4911 
07/14/2009 Navajo Wind Energy Corp 1090 First Wind Energy Systems 3511 
05/06/2009 NuEnergy Group Inc 1731 NuEnergy Group Inc 1731 
02/06/2009 Valero Energy Corp 2911 Verasun Energy Corp-Plants 2911 
10/22/2008 Environmental Technologies Int 3580 Atlantic Wind & Solar Corp 4911 
05/29/2008 Basic Energy Services Inc 1389 Triple N Services Inc 1389 
 
Second Group 
Announcement 
date 
Acquiring Company 
SIC 
(acq.) 
Target Company 
SIC 
(tar.) 
12/17/2015 Earthstone Energy Inc 1311 Lynden Energy Corp 1311 
06/10/2015 Gulfport Energy Corp 1311 Amer Energy-Appalachian Asts 1311 
12/02/2014 Southwestern Energy Co 1311 WPX Energy Inc-Oil & Gas Asts 1311 
10/24/2014 BreitBurn Energy Partners LP 1311 Antares Energy Ltd-Southern Star 1311 
10/16/2014 Southwestern Energy Co 1311 Chesapeake Energy Corp-Assets 1311 
07/29/2014 SM Energy Co 1311 Baytex Energy Corp-N Dakota 1311 
07/24/2014 BreitBurn Energy Partners LP 1311 QR Energy LP 1311 
06/30/2014 LINN Energy LLC 1311 Devon Energy Corp-Non-core Asset 1311 
05/01/2014 Miller Energy Resources Inc 1311 Anchor Point Energy LLC 4922 
04/08/2014 Athlon Energy Inc 1311 Piedra Energy II LLC-Certain 1311 
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12/23/2013 Regency Energy Partners LP (2x) 1311 Hoover Energy-Midstream Assets, 
Eagle Rock Energy-Midstream  
1311, 
1311 
11/20/2013 Devon Energy Corp 1311 GeoSouthern Energy Corp-Eagle 1311 
10/20/2013 Athlon Energy Inc 1311 HVL Energy LLC-Permian Assets 1311 
08/14/2013 Duma Energy Corp 1311 Hydrocarb Energy Corp 1311 
08/09/2013 Constellation Energy Partners 1311 Sanchez Energy Corp-Assets 1311 
07/29/2013 EnerJex Resources Inc 1311 Black Raven Energy Inc 1311 
06/04/2013 New Source Energy Partners LP 1311 New Source Energy Corp-Oil & 1311 
04/29/2013 Southwestern Energy Co 1311 Chesapeake Energy-Marcellus 1311 
09/05/2012 Miller Energy Resources Inc 1311 PDC Energy Inc-Tennessee Asset 1311 
08/08/2012 BCM Energy Partners Inc 1311 New Times Energy-Property, LA 1311 
01/20/2012 Blast Energy Services Inc 1311 Pacific Energy Development 1311 
12/01/2011 Constellation Energy Group Inc 1311 ONEOK Energy Marketing Co 4925 
12/01/2011 Lucas Energy Inc 1311 Hall Phoenix Energy LLC-Property 1311 
10/04/2011 Ring Energy Inc 1311 Stanford Energy Inc 1311 
07/20/2011 Blue Dolphin Energy Co 1311 Lazarus Energy LLC 1311 
06/22/2011 Pioneer Southwest Energy  1311 Plains Marketing LP 5172 
05/12/2011 Constellation Energy Group Inc 1311 MXenergy Inc 4911 
05/06/2011 Fortune Oil & Gas Inc 1311 Cressent Energy Inc 1311 
04/20/2011 Exterra Energy Inc 1311 Resonance Energy LLC 1382 
04/12/2011 Eagle Rock Energy Partners LP 1311 CC Energy II LLC 1311 
29/11/2010 Chesapeake Energy Corp 1311 Antares Energy-Yellow Bluebonn 1311 
10/04/2010 Eagle Rock Energy Partners LP 1311 Centerpoint-Gas Gathering 4925 
09/14/2010 Noble Energy Inc 1311 Twister Prospect, DJ Basin, CO 1311 
08/09/2010 EV Energy Partners LP 1311 Petrohawk Energy Corp-Oil 1311 
04/16/2010 Constellation Energy Group Inc 1311 Navasota Energy Partners LP- 4923 
01/05/2010 Noble Energy Inc 1311 Suncor Energy-Rockies Upstream 1311 
12/04/2008 Devon Energy Corp 1311 Linn Energy LLC-Cert Central 1311 
08/08/2008 Encore Energy Systems Inc 1311 BioConversions International 4911 
07/31/2008 MarkWest Energy Partners LP 1311 PetroQuest Energy Inc-Assets 1389 
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04/30/2008 Stone Energy Corp 1311 Bois d'Arc Energy Inc 1311 
 
Third Group 
Announcement 
date 
Acquiring Company 
SIC 
(acq.) 
Target Company 
SIC 
(tar.) 
11/05/2015 Rice Midstream Partners LP 4922 Rice Energy-Water Services 4971 
07/09/2015 Spark Energy Inc 4931 CenStar Energy Corp 1311 
05/12/2015 Spark Energy Inc 4931 Oasis Power LLC 4911 
02/09/2015 Rose Rock Midstream LP 4610 Wattenberg Holding LLC 4612 
02/03/2015 Macquarie Infrastructure Co 5172 Bayonne Energy LLC-Bayonne 4911 
01/26/2015 Energy Transfer Partners LP 4922 Regency Energy Partners LP 1311 
09/17/2014 Enbridge Energy Partners LP 4610 Enbridge Energy Co-Alberta 4612 
09/15/2014 PBF Logistics LP 4610 PBF Energy Inc-Delaware City 1389 
06/23/2014 Wisconsin Energy Corp 4931 Integrys Energy Group Inc 4931 
06/17/2014 Valero Energy Partners LP 4610 Valero Energy Corp-Assets 4613 
06/05/2014 Rose Rock Midstream LP 4610 Chesapeake Energy Marketing-Assets 1311 
05/13/2014 Tallgrass Energy Partners LP 4922 BNN Energy LLC 1623 
02/28/2014 Access Midstream Partners LP 4922 Chesapeake-Compression Assets 1311 
11/08/2013 Rose Rock Midstream LP 4610 Noble Energy-Tampa Pipeline 4613 
11/06/2013 NGL Energy Partners LP 5172 Gavilon LLC-Energy Business 1711 
11/04/2013 Avista Corp 4931 Alaska Energy & Resources Co 4911 
06/11/2013 Spectra Energy Partners LP 4922 Spectra Energy-Remaining Asset 4923 
05/28/2013 NorthWestern Corp 4931 Devon Energy Corp-Bear Paw 1311 
04/15/2013 Blue Earth Inc  (2x) 4991 Global Renewable Energy Sys, 
IPS Power Engineering Inc 
8711, 
8711 
01/29/2013 Kinder Morgan Energy Partners 4922 Copano Energy LLC 4923 
11/09/2012 NGL Energy Partners LP 5172 Whiting Energy Fuels-Propane 5172 
10/01/2012 Wisconsin Public Service Corp 4931 Fox Energy Co LLC 3612 
09/04/2012 NorthWestern Corp 4931 NFR Energy-Natural Gas 1311 
06/08/2012 Chesapeake Midstream Partners 4922 Chesapeake Energy-Cert. Assets 4922 
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05/21/2012 NGL Energy Partners LP (2x) 5172 High Sierra Energy GP LLC,                
High Sierra Energy LP 
1321, 
1321 
04/23/2012 NGL Energy Partners LP 5172 Downeast Energy-Maine, NH Asts 5984 
04/12/2011 NorthWestern Corp 4931 Spion Kop Wind-wind project 4911 
02/02/2011 Laidlaw Energy Group Inc 4931 Renegy Holdings-Biomass Plant 4911 
01/19/2011 Sempra Energy Inc 4932 AEI Americas Bermuda Ltd 4924 
01/10/2011 Duke Energy Corp 4931 Progress Energy Inc 4911 
10/20/2010 The X-Change Corp 4813 GhG SaviorTech Corp 2812 
09/10/2010 Adino Energy Corp 5171 PetroGreen Energy LLC 1311 
09/07/2010 Enterprise Products Partners 4922 Enterprise GP Holdings LP 4922 
08/23/2010 National Clean Fuels Inc 7699 China National Solar 4911 
08/23/2010 XcelPlus Global Holdings Inc 8748 Sunfield Technologies 5722 
06/24/2010 GDT Tek Inc 7370 RTR Global Investments LLC 4953 
05/11/2010 Energy Transfer Equity LP 4922 Regency GP LP 4922 
02/22/2010 Refill Energy Inc 4925 Intl Green N-ergy Corp 4932 
08/31/2009 Kinder Morgan Energy Partners 4922 Undisclosed Natural Gas 4922 
06/03/2009 Premier Power Renew En. Inc 4931 Arco Energy Srl 4911 
08/25/2008 Covanta Holding Corp 4991 Biomass Energy Facilities 4911 
07/28/2008 Sempra Energy Inc 4932 EnergySouth Inc 4924 
06/26/2008 Duke Energy Corp 4931 Catamount Energy Corp 4911 
 
Fourth Group 
Announcement 
date 
Acquiring Company 
SIC 
(acq.) 
Target Company 
SIC 
(tar.) 
22/2/2016 NextEra Energy Partners LP 4911 NextEra Resources-Seiling 4911 
10/05/2015 NextEra Energy Partners LP 4911 NextEra Energy-Jericho Energy 4911 
04/29/2015 NextEra Energy Partners LP 4911 NextEra Energy Resources-Wind 4911 
11/05/2014 NRG Yield Inc 4911 NRG Energy Inc-Assets 4911 
10/29/2014 Ormat Technologies Inc 4911 Ormat Industries Ltd 4911 
10/16/2014 US Geothermal Inc 4911 Earth Power Resources Inc 4911 
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08/22/2014 Dynegy Inc 4911 Duke Energy Corp-Commercial 4931 
06/04/2014 NRG Yield Inc 4911 Terra-Gen Power-Alta Wind 4931 
06/02/2014 DTE Energy Co 4911 NextEra Energy-Wind Farm 4911 
05/06/2014 NRG Yield Inc 4911 NRG Energy-Solar Facilities 4911 
01/09/2014 McKenzie Bay International Ltd 4911 Clean Green Energy LLC 5074 
12/03/2013 NRG Yield Inc 4911 Energy Systems Co 4961 
10/18/2013 NRG Energy Inc 4911 Edison Mission Energy Co 4911 
06/25/2013 Edison International Corp 4911 SoCore Energy LLC 4911 
07/22/2012 NRG Energy Inc 4911 GenOn Energy Inc 4911 
16/2/2012 Primary Energy Recycling Corp 4911 Primary Energy Recycling Holding 4911 
10/25/2011 Entergy Corp 4911 NextEra-Rhode Island State 4911 
08/16/2011 NRG Energy Inc 4911 Energy Plus Holdings LLC 4911 
07/26/2011 DTE Energy Co (2x) 4911 Heritage Sustainable-Wind Energy, 
Wind Energy-Wind Energy Leases 
4911, 
4911 
09/16/2010 NRG Energy Inc 4911 Green Mountain Energy Co 4911 
03/04/2010 Wind Energy America Inc 4911 Averill Wind LLC 4911 
02/11/2010 FirstEnergy Corp 4911 Allegheny Energy Inc 4911 
11/09/2009 NRG Energy Inc 4911 Bluewater Wind LLC 4911 
03/02/2009 NRG Energy Inc 4911 Reliant Energy Inc-Retail 4911 
 
